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that conceptual extension may reveal more than it obscures (225). Still, 
because he does not examine such cases in detail, his analysis of objection-
able linguistic expansions remains imprecise.
Sophie Grace Chappell’s essay defending the doctrine of double effect 
(DDE) is a highlight of the volume. She uses Wittgenstein-inspired argu-
ments to argue that intentions, like mental states generally, are essentially 
public. An agent’s intentions are linked to what action-types are ascrib-
able to her given her behavior, chosen means, and circumstances. This 
ascribability is, in turn, determined by convention in a way analogous to 
how the meanings of speech acts depend on convention. Thus we uncover 
the morally significant difference between familiar cases like Surgeon 
and Trolley: any interpreter competent with our conventions would as-
cribe a killing intention to the organ-harvesting surgeon, but not to the 
trolley-turner. Chappell’s arguments are too rich to do justice to here. For 
instance, she provocatively argues that internalism about intention would 
collapse the DDE into consequentalism and that while the DDE is helpful 
for addressing some moral conundrums, it is not the relevant casuistic 
device in many of the cases to which it has been applied. Her account fal-
ters in its Wittgensteinian reliance on convention, which is vulnerable to 
the consequentialist rebuttal that folk psychological conventions are often 
incoherent and require radical revision. When considering particular ex-
amples, moreover, Chappell appeals to reasons rather than directly to con-
ventions to explain why we take a certain result to be (un)intended. It is 
these reasons, we suggest, that ultimately decide between “conventional” 
understandings of actions/intentions and their consequentialist rivals.
Considered as a whole, the volume is uneven, as is typical of essay col-
lections. Further, its ideal audience also is not obvious. Philosophers may 
find some of the general treatments of Wittgenstein on religious language 
useful (including for students) and will find some of the ethical contribu-
tions thought-provoking, but likely will be unengaged by the theological 
essays. Theologians and religious ethicists are likeliest to be interested in 
all the topics treated, but may well find the theological contributions the 
most stylistically difficult—and rather disappointing in substance.
Religious Ethics and Constructivism: A Metaethical Inquiry , edited by Kevin 
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Philosophy of religion has traditionally been dominated by work in meta-
physics and epistemology. The relationship between theistic belief and 




ethical theory, especially metaethics, has been relatively ignored. Kevin 
Jung’s edited collection of essays, Religious Ethics and Constructivism, aims 
to address this neglect by bringing together a range of voices to reflect on 
the relationship between theistic commitments and constructivist meta-
ethics. In his introduction, Jung indicates that this project was undertaken 
in response to the growing number of religious thinkers who entertain or 
endorse antirealist constructivist metaethics (8). He writes, “[M]any con-
temporary religious thinkers see religious morality as a human construc-
tion that reflects the contingent needs, interests, or attitudes of religious 
practitioners” (8). At the same time, however, he thinks these thinkers 
have not thought carefully about what it means to say that morality is a 
“human construction” or what such a view implies. Thus, the aim of the 
book is “to discuss the merits of constructivism vis-à-vis religious ethics” 
(8). The extent to which the essays included in the book contribute to this 
end, however, varies significantly.
The first three essays all advocate some form of constructivism. One 
of the challenges of exploring the relationship between theistic belief and 
constructivist metaethics is that “constructivism” refers to a wide range 
of views. The book includes discussions of four broad types of construc-
tivism: Kantian, Humean, Hegelian, and theistic constructivism. But each 
of these types of constructivism can itself encompass several variations, 
as Jung himself notices. Indeed, one of the strengths of this book is the 
solid overview of constructivism and its many varieties provided by Jung 
in the introduction. Typically, the many different types of constructivism 
differ in how “thoroughgoing” their constructivism is: Are all normative 
concepts constructed? Only some? Which ones? Paul Weithman, for in-
stance, defends the view that distributive justice is constructed, much in 
the way that baseball is constructed: distributive justice is a game of social 
cooperation. Kevin Kinghorn, by contrast, endorses a more thoroughgo-
ing (but still restricted) constructivism when he argues that wrongness is 
constructed, while Molly Farneth argues that we should not simply be 
constructivists about the truth of normative claims or our entitlement to 
our normative commitments (like the Kantians), but that we should be 
constructivists about the semantics of normative claims.
The quality of each of their contributions to the project of assessing “the 
merits of constructivism vis-à-vis religious ethics” (8) varies inversely with 
how thoroughgoing their constructivism is. I’m not sure this is entirely 
coincidental. The more restricted one’s constructivism, the more one can 
appeal to resources outside of constructivism to assuage concerns raised 
by theists. Weithman, for instance, responding to the objection that the 
constructivist’s social ideal is not the same as the Christian ideal, claims 
that the constructivist social ideal he defends is not the whole of ethics: 
he is merely claiming that distributive justice is a social cooperation game 
that involves the construction of a certain kind of ideal, but not that this 
ideal tells us everything there is to know about how things ought to be. 
Thus, Weithman can make room for appeals to realist properties or divine 
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commands or whatever grounding of normative properties his interlocu-
tor might prefer. It is only this one aspect of moral life that he claims is 
constructed by humans. That said, I do not think this is the only reason 
Weithman was the most successful at engaging theistic concerns.
In his defense of Humean constructivism, Kevin Kinghorn responds to 
a number of possible objections, but I do not think he engages the most 
serious concerns about his view. Kinghorn is only a constructivist about 
wrongness; he thinks there are facts about goodness and badness. (He is a 
welfarist about goodness, another controversial position for a theist, but I 
am only going to engage his constructivism here.) When an action is suf-
ficiently bad that someone, upon reflection, forms the intent to sanction 
it, then it is wrong (47–48). We might pause here to ask some questions. 
(1) Is an action wrong whenever anyone, upon reflection, forms the intent 
to sanction? If not, who has the standing to determine what’s wrong? King-
horn seems to think only in terms of our individual judgments of wrong-
ness and says that our judgments are correct or incorrect insofar as the 
judgment is entailed by one’s evaluative standpoint, but this seems like an 
uneasy position for a theist, who will likely want to say that God’s judg-
ments of right and wrong are correct and that any judgments we have that 
conflict with God’s are incorrect. Furthermore, we might wonder (2) why 
a realist cannot endorse the view that an action is wrong when it crosses a 
certain threshold of badness, and that this is a fact about the action. King-
horn seems to assume that realism is always non-natural: “Is there some-
thing beyond these facts about others’ intent to sanction? Are governing 
bodies recognizing some non-natural facts about rights and ownership and 
wrongness—and then announcing their intent to sanction as a response to 
these facts” (48)? But why build non-naturalness into the question? Per-
haps wrongness is a natural property reducible to other natural properties. 
Finally, (3) Kinghorn’s account simply seems an odd view of wrongness, as 
there does not seem to be any conceptual incoherence in judging an action 
wrong in the absence of anyone’s forming an intent to sanction.
These concerns take on added force when raised from a theistic per-
spective. This should already be apparent in my discussion of the first 
question: Who has authority to form the intent to sanction? It would seem 
natural for a theist to point to God as the ultimate authority on wrong-
ness. But my second point shows that Kinghorn hasn’t given us adequate 
reason to prefer his view to alternative theistic views. Finally, my third 
point might also prompt a theist to turn to God: though we humans might 
sometimes decline to form the intent to sanction something we judge 
wrong, God is perfectly just and this might entail that God always forms 
the intent to sanction wrong action (I’m not convinced by this move, but 
I could imagine someone pursuing it). But once you turn to God in re-
sponse to either my first or third questions, it seems like you have aban-
doned Humean constructivism for theistic constructivism.
Of the three opening chapters, Farneth’s does the least to further re-
flection on the plausibility of constructivism from a theistic perspective. 
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As I explained above, Farneth argues for a Hegelian constructivism that 
extends to the semantics of normative claims. In her own words:
By calling attention to Hegel’s semantics, I aim to bring out the possible 
significance of a ‘Hegelian constructivism’ for contemporary metaethics. In 
what follows, I outline Hegel’s account of the construction of the content or 
meaning of candidates for normative truth or falsity and suggest what fol-
lows from that account in terms of normativity, authority, and truth. This, 
then, sets the stage for a conversation with Kantian constructivists about 
what might be missing from that account and what the implications of an 
explicit semantics might be. (66)
Notice that her outline of what she will do in this essay makes no men-
tion of theism or religious ethics, and rightly so: the relationship between 
Hegelian constructivism and religious ethics simply isn’t her concern in 
this chapter. As a piece of philosophy, her essay is interesting and thought-
provoking for those already engaged in the constructivist project (though 
I wish she had said more about why some might resist extending their 
constructivist project to the semantics of normative principles). However, 
the basis for her essay’s inclusion in this volume seems tenuous at best: she 
discusses Hegel’s treatment of the principle “love thy neighbor as thyself” 
and observes that some theists might be uncomfortable with Hegelian 
semantics. Having made that observation, she does not engage any sub-
stantive arguments that they should or should not be okay with Hegelian 
semantics; she merely notes that some theologians talk in ways compat-
ible with Hegelian semantics. But why should I care if some theologians 
talk this way? I’m interested in whether theists should have problems with 
Hegelian semantics. If so, why? If not, why not?
The strongest contribution to this collection, given its stated aim, is 
Christian Miller’s essay. He directly takes on the project of the book, giv-
ing accounts of constructivism and theism before assessing how plausible 
constructivism is given theistic commitment. Miller differentiates types of 
constructivism based on who is doing the relevant construction. Thus, there 
are secular types of constructivism, in which the construction is done by 
actual humans, hypothetical humans, or hypothetical non-human beings; 
but there is also theistic constructivism, in which an actual divine being 
does the construction. Miller argues, first, that “there are good reasons 
to favor theistic over hypothetical constructivism and no good reasons 
(or at least not as good reasons) to do the reverse” (88). Second, he points 
out that constructivism of certain sorts will have a hard time explaining 
normative properties attributed to God, as when theists claim that God is 
good, just, wise, etc. (90).
Miller acknowledges that his arguments only give us prima facie evi-
dence against secular constructivism, especially in light of the wide variety 
of constructivisms. However, he also illustrates how his argument works 
against three existing secular constructivist theories. It is also telling that, 
even prior to reading Miller’s piece, I was essentially applying his first 
argument to Kinghorn’s constructivism: Why would a theist be a Humean 
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constructivist rather than a theistic constructivist? Miller’s second argu-
ment works best against thoroughgoing forms of constructivism, since it 
seems that not all normative and evaluative concepts can be constructed 
if we are going to attribute goodness, justice, wisdom, etc. to God. How-
ever, some more restricted forms of constructivism might be plausible, 
particularly constructivism about deontic concepts. Miller concludes that 
a theist could plausibly be a restricted theistic constructivist about deontic 
concepts. There are still questions to answer: Why be a theistic construc-
tivist rather than a realist? What kind of theistic constructivism is most 
plausible? One that grounds deontic properties in divine commands? Di-
vine virtues? Divine desires? Are deontic properties identical to/caused 
by/constituted by divine commands/virtues/desires? But there is room for 
a theist to embrace certain forms of constructivism.
The next two essays, chapters 5 and 6, are more historically oriented. 
Charles Lockwood critiques Kantian constructivism both as incoherent in 
its own right and as a bad interpretation of Kant. He claims that Kantian 
constructivists read Kant as grounding moral content in autonomy, but in 
fact Kant arrives at autonomy as a solution to a puzzle about moral mo-
tivation—not moral content. Furthermore, he maintains that this reading 
of Kant is friendlier to theism. Indeed, part of his argument for his read-
ing of Kant is that it makes better sense of Kant’s inclusion of God in the 
Kingdom of Ends. Lockwood even goes so far as to entertain the possibil-
ity that Kant’s ethics might be compatible with certain versions of divine 
command theory. I’m largely convinced by Lockwood’s argument against 
constructivist readings of Kant. I do find the inclusion of this essay in this 
book somewhat puzzling as it isn’t ultimately about constructivism’s mer-
its from a theistic point of view. Rather, it is arguing that Kant’s own ethic 
is both non-constructivist and “robustly theistic” (124).
David Clairmont’s contribution is essentially a “compare and contrast” 
piece on Jeffrey Stout’s Hegelian constructivism and Jean Porter’s revision-
ist natural law theory. He seems more sympathetic to Porter, but the piece 
isn’t really an argument for one view over the other so much as an ex-
ploration of their different understandings of nature and its intelligibility. 
One of the more interesting suggestions Clairmont makes is that Porter’s 
revisionist natural law theory might, in fact, be more truly Hegelian than 
Stout’s Hegelian constructivism because Stout denies that nature has any 
moral significance independently of what reason imposes on it, whereas 
Hegel seems to think that rational consciousness can discern patterns in 
nature that serve as models for that rational consciousness (146–147). This 
chapter also provides the only sustained engagement with a prominent 
constructivist religious ethicist.
The final chapter, by Kevin Jung, is a critique of Christine Korsgaard’s 
Kantian constructivism and Sharon Street’s Humean constructivism, both 
of which are thoroughgoing constructivist theories. Though Jung raises 
some distinctively theistic concerns early on (Why wouldn’t God evaluate 
the world by God’s own standards rather than ours? Why would God 
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allow us to ground all normative facts in our attitudes rather than God’s? 
[178–179]), he mostly rehearses some well-established criticisms of their 
views not grounded in theism. His most interesting work is in his dis-
cussion of the relationship between moral goodness and divine willing at 
the end of his essay. Having advocated a realist position on which moral 
goodness is grounded in “natural facts concerning the flourishing of life 
in general” (201), a theist might naturally wonder how Jung thinks God’s 
will is related to moral goodness. Following John Duns Scotus, Jung dis-
tinguishes between God’s willing and God’s willing for our willing, and 
contends that God’s willing for our willing includes “God’s intentional 
endorsement of things that are intrinsically good or bad” (200, emphasis 
in original). Facts about value are in some sense independent of God, but 
God’s willing for our willing tracks moral goodness.
In short, this collection of essays aims to take on an important issue: as-
sessing a group of prominent antirealist metaethical views from a theistic 
standpoint. However, scholars interested in this question would be best 
served to focus on certain essays, beginning with Christian Miller’s and 
then turning their attention to those essays that deal with the versions of 
constructivism that most interest them. Some of the essays don’t really 
discuss the interaction of constructivism with theistic belief, but do dis-
cuss interactions between other ethical views and theism, like Lockwood’s 
and Jung’s essays (though both pieces discuss Kantian constructivism). 
Still other essays discuss constructivism, but don’t really engage theistic 
concerns, such as Farneth’s piece, though those interested in Hegelian con-
structivism may profit from reading her piece. The book as a whole does 
not provide the sustained reflection on the merits of constructivism from 
a theistic perspective that one might have expected, but it does have mo-
ments of clear and useful engagement on this topic. And, at the very least, 
it has initiated a much-needed discussion about metaethics and theism.
Thomas Aquinas on Moral Wrongdoing , by Colleen McCluskey. Cambridge 
University Press, 2017. Pp. xiii + 198. $ 110.00 (hardcover), $ 28.99 (paper-
back).
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“Evil as a philosophical topic has arrived” (4). With these words, Colleen 
McCluskey wraps up a brief look at the recent history of the topic of her 
book, “the attempt to explain wrongdoing on its own terms” (2). As she 
notes, certain issues concerning evil have been getting serious attention 
for quite some time. Most notable in this regard is the theological problem 
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